幕小后

Asia.view
亚洲视野
Overconfident India
自负的印度
Jul 9th 2008
From Economist.com

Indians are complacent about the perils of multi-lateral diplomacy, and much else
如今的印度人沾沾自喜，看不到多边外交的危险性，对于其它许多事情也同样如此。

IT CAME like monsoon rain, after a head-aching spell of summer heat. On July 7th, ending months of mixed messages and tiresome speculation, Manmohan Singh, the prime minister, said that India would press ahead “very soon” with a controversial policy: a civil-nuclear co-operation agreement with America.

就像是在夏季经历了一段令人头昏脑胀的炙热天气之后，突然下了一阵季雨。7月7日，印度总理曼莫汉•辛格终结了数月来甚嚣尘上的种种令人喜忧参半的讯息以及惹人生厌的猜测，他说印度会”即刻”推行一项备受争议的政策：即与美国达成在民用核能领域开展合作的协议。

This would give India access to nuclear fuel and technology, despite its refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In a country with massive energy needs, and pretensions to global-power status, that would be momentous. Only, the deal is not yet done: it needs approving by the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency, the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and America’s Congress. Winning their blessings before President George Bush’s term expires next January will be tight.

这份协议将给予印度使用核燃料和核技术的权力，尽管该国拒绝签署《核不扩散条约》。在这样一个能源需求巨大，自命为世界大国的国家中，这份协议的意义极其重大。只是该协议尚未完成：它需要得到联合国国际原子能机构，拥有45个成员国的核供应国集团（NSG）以及美国国会的批准。在乔治•布什总统明年1月份离任之前要赢得他们的许可并不是件容易的事情。

Not that you would necessarily know this from Indian media coverage of the saga. Most Indian commentators-including those within the ruling Congress party-appear to have concluded that, now that Mr Singh has plumped for it, despite opposition from his government’s parliamentary allies, the deal is a dead-cert.

但是从印度媒体对此事的报道中你不一定能了解到这些事情。包括执政的国大党内部的许多印度评论员似乎已经得出结论：尽管辛格政府在议会中的盟友反对这一协议，然鉴于辛格总理本人已表态支持，这项协议已是铁板钉钉的事了。

They may turn out to be right. Mr Bush will certainly push hard for it. But with several other NSG members having expressed concerns, and the attitude of China, India’s great rival, still unknown, the deal’s safe passage cannot be assumed. Then again, it is unsurprising that so many Indians do assume it. A pronounced feature of their country’s rapid emergence is the awesome self-confidence-and sometimes hubris-it inspires in Indian breasts.

他们的想法或许会被证明是正确的。为了该协议获得通过，布什自然会不遗余力。但是核供应国集团中已有几位成员国对此表示忧虑，印度最大的对手中国的态度还不明朗，所以不能假定说该协议会安全通过。然而又一次，如此多的印度人的确认为它会安全通过，这并不令人惊讶。印度快速崛起的一个显著特征就是它激发了印度人胸中令人敬畏的自信心，有时就显得骄傲自大了。

No visitor to the country can fail to be impressed by this. Its English language newspapers-admittedly, read mainly by a prospering minority-would never let them. They have long tended towards triumphalism-notwithstanding more sober recent headlines, inspired by high inflation and a plunging stockmarket. Thus, the latest foreign acquisition by “India Inc.”, as the country’s private sector is known, is a sure-fire splash. On editorial pages, Indian economists have long predicted China-style, double-digit economic growth for their country.

到过印度的访客没有哪一位不对此印象深刻。印度的英文报纸（诚如，他们的读者群主要是少数活得有滋有味的人士）肯定会让这些访客感受到印度人爆棚的自信心。长期以来这些报纸都倾向于必胜主义，虽然最近高企的通胀率和下跌的股市让报纸的头条清醒了许多。因此，”印度公司”（印度的私营行业就是这样被称呼的）最近进行的海外并购势必会激起一片叫好声。在社论版，印度的经济学家长期以来一直预测说印度的经济会同中国一样，双位数增长。

Opinion polls-which tend to represent the views of relatively-rich city-dwelling Indians-also make rousing news. A survey of global attitudes, released last month by the Pew Research Centre, found that a higher proportion of Indians felt positive about their national economy than all except Chinese and Australians (though the proportion of sunny Indians, at 62%, was 12% down on the previous year).

往往倾向代表印度相对富裕的城市居民观点的民意调查也发来了令人振奋的消息。上个月Pew 研究中心发布的一次全球民调显示，印度人当中对于国民经济持乐观态度民众的比例高过其他国家，仅次于中国人和澳大利亚人（但是乐观的印度人所占的比例为 62%，这比上一年下降了12个百分点）

Indeed, they have had lots to be cheered by. Over the past three years, India’s economy has grown at a magnificent average of 9% a year. And the private sector-whose foreign investments last year exceeded those made in India by foreign firms-has led the charge.

的确，印度人有许多事情值得庆祝。在过去三年间，印度经济年平均增长速度达到了令人炫目的9%。私营行业去年的对外投资超过了外商在印度的投资，他们已成为经济增长的引领者。

As has been widely reported, the fruits of India’s economic rise are rich and varied. The country’s massive armed forces are modernising. The diplomatic corps is swelling. India’s revered cricketers, who were never so rich and pampered, are doing consistently better than they have ever done before.

正如广泛报道的那样，印度经济崛起的成果可谓丰富多彩。庞大的军队正步入现代化。外交使团的人数剧增。印度备受尊崇的板球运动员从来没有像现在这般富有，集万千宠爱于一身。如今他们的表现要比以前好得多，而且能做到始终如一。

But, impressive as these successes are, they do not augur the imminent global dominance that many Indians seem to expect. Foreign visitors to India are also invariably impressed by its dreadful problems: the ever-present poor; perilous and congested roads; disorderly and congested airports; the moronic regulations still imposed by the state.

这些成功之处固然令人印象深刻，但是他们并非如许多印度人似乎期许的那样，预示着印度即将在世界上居于支配地位。印度许多可怕的问题也总是会给造访的外国人留下难以磨灭的印象：无时不在的穷人; 危险而拥塞的道路，杂乱拥挤的机场以及政府依旧实施的各类鲁钝的管制。

So, what makes Indians so buoyant? Perhaps, relief: that the dark decades of soaring population growth, inching economic growth and intractable poverty, are finally over. No doubt, too, some prominent Indians are a little naive about the realities of multi-lateral diplomacy and ill-informed about the paths to development that others have trod. With little opportunity to travel, and a whole world within their borders, Indians have tended, until relatively recently, to be rather inward-looking-unlike the country’s vast and thriving diaspora.

那么究竟是什么让印度人如此信心满怀？或许是一种宽慰感：在过去黑暗的数十年间印度人口增长迅猛，经济增长缓慢，贫穷根深蒂固，现在这一切终于一去不复返了。无疑，一些杰出的印度人对于多边外交活动的现实情况显得有点单纯无知，对于别国走出的发展路径也不甚明了。印度人很少有机会出外旅行，一直以来都是在本国境内走动，直至近来，他们都显得相当保守内向。这与印度庞大兴旺的海外移民形成鲜明对照。

Perhaps, too, there may be something about living always in a crowd that encourages loud and overconfident opinion-giving. Or maybe, in their national subconscious, Indians have calculated that audacity, however unfitting at the time, simply works for them. It is certainly a feature of their brilliant entrepreneurism: another national ch***cteristic-exhibited in teeming slums as well as in corporate boardrooms.

或许这也与总是生活在一个提倡说出自负观点的人群中有关。或许在其民族潜意识中，印度人已经算计出大胆厚颜虽然不合时宜，但对他们来说很有效果。这也是印度人卓越的企业家精神的一大特征：这是印度人又一个民族特性。这种特性在公司的董事会以及拥挤的贫民窟中一览无遗。

As for the nuclear deal, Indians’ blithe faith in its chances may stem from something else altogether. The Pew Research Centre found that Mr Bush’s approval rating in India was “still astonishingly high” at 55%. In fact, Indians were the only people sampled who rated Mr Bush more highly than they did Vladimir Putin, Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy. So, perhaps they know something the rest of us don’t?

就这项核能合作协议而言，印度人对其成功的几率如此自信的原因或许源自别处。Pew 研究中心发现印度人对布什的支持率”依然高达55%，令人震惊”。事实上，在抽样调查的国家中，印度是唯一一个布什的支持率高过普京，默克尔和萨科齐的国家。或许他们知道一些我们不了解的事情？

幕小后

[2008.07.12] 本报与伊朗:不再沉默归类于： 社论 — Eco Team @ 9:07 pm
Iran and The Economist
本报与伊朗Silent no more
不再沉默Jul 10th 2008
From The Economist print edition
An Iranian student protester, sentenced to death for appearing on our cover, has escaped to America
一位曾因在本报封面上露面而被判处死刑的伊朗学生已经逃到美国。


NINE years ago, Ahmad Batebi appeared on the cover of The Economist. He was a 21-year-old student, one of thousands who protested against Iran’s government that summer. He was photographed holding aloft a T-shirt bespattered with the blood of a fellow protester. Soon afterwards, he was arrested and shown our issue of July 17th 1999. “With this”, he was told, “you have signed your death warrant.”
9年前Ahmad Batebi出现在《经济学人》的封面上。他当时是个21岁的学生，是那个夏天成千上万抗议伊朗政府人群中的一员。他高举一件溅满同伴鲜血的T恤的形象被拍进照片，政府很快将他逮捕，并给他看了本报1999年7月17日版。”有了这个”有人告诉他，”你就等于签了死刑判决书了。”
During his interrogation he was blindfolded and beaten with cables until he passed out. His captors rubbed salt into his wounds to wake him up, so they could torture him more. They held his head in a drain full of sewage until he inhaled it. He recalls yearning for a swift death to end the pain. He was played recordings of what he was told was his mother being tortured. His captors wanted him to betray his fellow students, to implicate them in various crimes and to say on television that the blood on that T-shirt was only red paint. He says he refused.
在审讯阶段，他被蒙住眼睛用钢鞭打到昏死过去。逮捕他的人把盐水浇到伤口上把他弄醒，这样就能进行更多折磨。他们压着他的头，浸入充满污物的水沟中，直到他把粪水吞进去。他记得当时只想快点死去，结束痛苦。有人给他放录音，告诉他这是他母亲被折磨时的惨叫。逮捕他的人逼他背叛同伴，指正他们犯了一系列罪行，并要他在电视中声明T恤中的血迹只是红色颜料。他说他拒绝了。
He was sentenced to death for “creating street unrest”. But after a global outcry, the sentence was commuted to 15 years in jail. He speculates that his high profile made it hard to kill him without attracting negative publicity. For two years, he was kept in solitary confinement, in a cell that was little more than a toilet hole with a wooden board on top. He was tortured constantly. Only when he was allowed to mingle with other prisoners again did he begin to overcome his despair.
他以”在大街上引起混乱”的罪名判处死刑。但在全球的反对浪潮下，最后减为15年监禁。他猜测也许因为自己知名度太高，杀死他很难而不招致恶评。他被单独监禁整整两年，关在一间只有一个厕所蹲位那么大的房子里，上面盖着一块木板。对他的折磨从未停息，只有在被允许再次和其他犯人呆在一起的时候，他才开始克服绝望。
He suffered a partial stroke that left the right side of his body without feeling. He needed medical attention. The regime did not want to be blamed for him dying behind bars, he says, so he was allowed out for treatment. Three months ago, on the day of the Persian new year, he escaped into Iraq. On June 24th he arrived in America.
他饱受偏瘫的折磨，整个右边的身子完全丧失感觉，需要医疗。他说政府不想因为他死于监狱而招受非议，所以允许他保外就医。三个月前，就在波斯历新年那一天，他逃到了伊拉克，6月24日到达美国。
He spoke to The Economist on July 7th. Looking at the picture that sparked his ordeal, he says that another man in his place might be angry, but he is not. Mr Batebi is a photographer himself. He says he understands what journalism involves. Had we not published the picture, he says, another paper might have. Looking at the same picture, his lawyer, interpreter and friend Lily Mazahery says she is close to tears: in it, the young Mr Batebi’s pale arms are as yet unscarred by torture.
7月7日他接受了《经济学人》的采访。看着给自己招致无数苦难的照片，他说如果换成其他人经受如此磨难必会愤懑在心，可他不会。Batebi先生也是摄像师，他说自己知道解新闻行业的规则，如果我们不公开这张照片，其他报纸也会。看着同一张照片，他的律师，翻译和朋友Lily Mazahery忍不住热泪盈眶。照片中年轻的Batebi先生手臂苍白依旧，却没有如今因拷打留下的点点伤痕。
The protests Mr Batebi took part in nine years ago frightened Iran’s rulers. The students were angry about censorship, the persecution of intellectuals and the thugs who beat up any student overheard disp***ging the regime. Mr Batebi thinks Iran could well turn solidly democratic some day. In neighbouring states, religious extremism is popular. In Iran, he says, the government is religiously extreme, but the people are not.
Batebi先生9年前参加的抗议活动曾让伊朗的统治者大为恐慌。学生们对严行审查制度，压迫知识分子的政府和捕风捉影，随意殴打任何对政府有异议学生的暴徒感到极度愤怒。Batebi先生认为伊朗某一天会实现真正的民主，他说在周邻国家宗教极端主义扎根与群众之中，而在伊朗只有政府才实行宗教极端政策，但老百姓并不支持。
He is cagey about how exactly he escaped. But he says he used a cellphone camera to record virtually every step of his journey, and will soon go public with the pictures and his commentary. Meanwhile, he seems to be enjoying America. He praises the way “people have the opportunity to become who they want to be”. Shortly after he arrived, he posted a picture of himself in front of the Capitol on his Farsi-language blog, with the caption: “Your hands will never touch me again.”
他十分小心避免透露逃脱的细节，但说用手机上的照相机记录下了全过程，将很快公开这些照片并加上自己的解说词。他似乎在美国过得不错。他赞美到那种”让人们有机会实现自我”的环境。来到美国不久，他在自己用波斯语撰写的博客上贴了一张照片。照片中的他站在国会大厦前，下面写到”你的手再碰不了我。”

幕小后

[2008.07.19] 中国商事：崩塌的垄断归类于： 中国 — Eco Team @ 9:17 pm
Business in China
中国商事Busting trust
崩塌的垄断Jul 17th 2008 | SHANGHAI
From The Economist print edition
The land of the mega-monopoly is about to adopt an antitrust law
大垄断者的地盘上要实行反垄断法

IT TOOK more time than the Long March and the Great Leap Forward combined, but after 14 years of wrangling China will introduce a comprehensive antitrust law on August 1st. It could prove to be hugely important: it has been called China’s “economic constitution”. The law would give China’s economy a further big push from central planning and state ownership towards *****, says Lester Ross of the Beijing office of WilmerHale, a law firm.
14年的争执不下，8月1日，中国将实行一个全面的反垄断法，虽然酝酿时间超过长征和大跃进总和，却意义非常：它被称成为中国的”经济宪法”。WilmerHale律师事务所驻京办事处的Lester Ross说，此法将大力推进中国由国有计划到市场经济的转型。
On the face of it, the law is desperately needed: energy, telecoms, transport, steel and many other industries lack competition, with a handful of dominant firms controlling prices not only for consumers, but for other companies too. Even fragmented industries, such as rice flour and instant noodles, where competition ought to abound, were recently reported to have seen price-fixing and collusion organised through the trade groups that are a legacy of the state-controlled economy.
乍一看来，实行此法刻不容缓：能源，电信，运输，钢铁和许多其他产业缺乏竞争，价格掌握在少数大公司手中，消费者和其他公司只能听之任之。米面和方便面这类的无领导者产业（Fragmented Industry），本应竞争激烈，前阵子却也有行业协会互相勾结，私自定价的报道。行业协会是国有计划经济遗留下来的产物。
At the moment competition is governed by a set of regulations from 2006, along with three other laws-the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, the Price Law and the Consumer Rights and Interests Protection Law. These various rules are scattered throughout China’s bureaucracy, and are universally condemned as toothless and lacking clarity. The new competition law reflects a belief by many in the Chinese government that the economic restructuring that began with the death of Mao can go forward only if consumers benefit from the lower prices and higher quality that competition produces.
如今的竞争由2006年来制定的一系列法规和其他三个法律管理，分别是：《反不正当竞争法》，《价格法》和《消费者权益保护法》。在中国，各个机构分管不同法规，人们普遍抱怨这一机制不透明，欠成效。竞争带来低价高质。自毛主席去世起，中国就启动了经济体制改革，但只有消费者享受到低价高质，才能推进改革。此法反映了中国政府内部许多人的这个观点。
Matched against this belief are more cynical and protectionist forces that have, alas, had a strong hand in shaping the new law. Many of the big Chinese monopolies are owned in part or whole by the state itself. One of the causes of the new law’s delay was the debate over whether these firms, which comprise a huge chunk of China’s economy, should be covered by it. After a series of drafts included and then excluded state-owned monopolies, a compromise was reached. The law applies to them, but with an exemption when economic or national security is threatened-a loophole almost as big as China itself.
愤世者和贸易保护主义者的观点与此相悖，却在新法制定中作用重大。中国现在的垄断集团，许多是完全或部分归政府所有，占中国经济很大比重，新法应否适用它们，一直争执不下，此为拖延出台的原因之一，正反观点的草案接连而出，最终达成妥协。新法适用于这类企业，若威胁经济或国家安全则另作考虑——这个空子怕是要赶上中国的大小了。
Worse is a suspicion that rather than going after the big monopolies, the law’s initial targets will be foreign companies. Taking a lead from the European Union, China will start reviewing mergers of companies, regardless of where they are based, so long as they operate within its borders or affect companies that do. Regulators will consider the effect on “the progress of technology” and “national economic development”. At the very least, this means large mergers must be blessed by the Chinese authorities, which will have a minimum of 30 days to assess them-and will be able to extend their review to 180 days. International law firms may be celebrating, but other companies must be lamenting that they will now face frictional costs to mergers in Beijing, as well as in Brussels and Washington, DC.
更糟糕的是，还有推测外企将首当其冲，而非大垄断者。紧随欧盟，中国将开始审查公司合并。无论哪国公司，只要在中国境内经营，或者对在中国境内经营的公司有影响，兼并都将受到审查。审查者将考虑对”科技进步”和”国民经济发展”的影响。这意味着，大型并购不管是否愿意，反正（at the very least,注意与at least的区别）必须取得官方通行证（意译），官方的评估至少30天，也有可能180天。从事国际法业务的律师事务所（International law firms）欢心鼓舞了，其他的公司只能叫苦不迭，他们在中国，比利时和美国的合并，将面临摩擦性成本。
The law may also conflict with intellectual-property rights. Chinese manufacturers in many industries have long bridled at being forced to cut their own production costs to retain sales, even as they have to pay what seem like large royalties to patent holders (as in the production of DVD players, for example). In industries such as software and pharmaceuticals, where the market is dominated by just a few foreign companies, the law may also justify litigation based on a superficial definition of dominance. It then allows prosecution over royalty rates, or restrictions on licensing. It is not hard to see how the law could be used to legitimise expropriation.
这部法律同样和知识产权存在冲突。中国很多行业的制造商被迫降低成本以保持销量，他们对此长期不满，而同时，他们却要向版权所有人交纳貌似巨大的版权费（比如DVD播放器的生产）。软件和制药之类的产业，少数外企占有多数市场份额，新法还可能给以”垄断”为借口的诉讼提供通行证，从而造成版税和授权限制的起诉。法律如何会被利用来合法征用，不难一见。
Worryingly, with only weeks before the law comes into effect, it has not yet been announced who will oversee it. The delay is a product of the competition within China’s bureaucracy, as rival agencies compete for such a valuable prize. One theory is that the job will be divided between three agencies. The winners will not only gain power within the national bureaucracy, but will be able to disrupt lucrative local monopolies that are often controlled by regional politicians. The new law could, in short, influence not just how business is run, but also how it is locally regulated.
令人担忧的是，据新法生效只有短短几周，监管机构却尚未宣布。政府内部机关争相食此大餐，造成拖延。一种意见认为须由三个机构共担此工。胜者不仅能有官方内部权利，还可以制止地方垄断企业的暴利，这些企业往往由地方官员控制。言而简之，新法影响的不仅是企业运营方式，还有地方政府管理模式。

幕小后

[2008.07.19] 奥巴马的造势之行：欢迎到访，总统竞选者先生归类于： 社论 — Eco Team @ 10:15 pm
B***ck Obama on tour
奥巴马的造势之行Welcome, Mr would-be President
欢迎到访，总统竞选者先生Jul 17th 2008
From The Economist print edition
But foreigners would be wise to temper their Obamamania, if only to limit future disappointment
戒慎追”马”热，宜静为后观


IF THE business of electing the most powerful man in the world were up to the world, rather than just those pesky Americans, B***ck Obama would face no contest. A poll for the Guardian this week, on the eve of Mr Obama’s whirlwind tour of Europe and the Middle East (half a dozen countries in a week, some for the first time in his life), shows that Britons would back him against John McCain by the astonishing margin of five to one. The Pew Research Centre reported last month that, in each of the main European countries, at least twice as many people have confidence in Mr Obama as in his rival. Elsewhere things are a bit more nuanced, but from Mexico to China, and from Russia to Australia, the foreigners are firmly in the Obama camp.
如果世界最高权力者的选举活动由全球共同参与，而不仅仅是那些恼人的老美，巴拉克•奥巴马大概就无需竞选了。本周，在他前往欧洲和中东开启旋风之旅（一周之内走访6个国家，有些还是他有生以来的首次造访）的前夕，《卫报》所做的一项民调显示，在英国，欲挺奥巴马的人数相对支持麦克恩的人数比例惊人，悬殊高达5：1。皮尤研究中心上个月的报告称，在各个欧洲大国，对奥巴马怀有信心的民众超过麦凯恩拥趸人数的至少一倍。在其他地区，差别略显微妙，但从墨西哥到中国，从俄罗斯到澳大利亚，外国人都坚定地站到了奥巴马阵营。
There are reasons for them to be more cautious. Marvellous orator and skilled electoral tactician though he may be, Mr Obama has not repealed the basic laws of politics. Most obviously, he may not win. Rasmussen, a pollster, rattled the Obama machine this week by showing the two candidates tied, and most other analysts agree that the bounce he enjoyed after seeing off Hillary Clinton has been small and short-lived. Mr Obama still definitely has the edge, but opinion at home diverges sharply from that in most of the rest of the world.
这些人要更加谨慎，原因有三。首先，尽管奥巴马是演说奇才，滔滔雄辩，而且善打选战，谋略一流，但政治上的基本法则并未因此就停摆。显而易见的是，他未必能赢。民调机构拉斯穆森(Rasmussen)本周发布的数据显示，两位候选人的民意支持度持平，这让奥巴马的竞选团队焦虑不安。而多数其他的分析人士也都意见一致，认为奥巴马在送别希拉里后获得的支持率反弹空间狭小，为时短暂。奥巴马仍握有相当的优势，但国内民意与世界其它大部分地区的舆论分歧甚巨。
Second, President Obama would not be answerable to the world that so adores him. A president is elected by America’s more ambivalent people, and is accountable only to them. And his powers are mightily constrained by Congress, which is even more immediately accountable to its electorate.
其二，当选后的奥巴马不会向这个对他爱宠有加的世界履职尽责。总统是由情绪矛盾的美利坚民族选出的，因此只对这些人负责。而且，总统职权受到国会的有力制约，而国会甚至更加直接地对选民负责。
Finally, there are some disquieting signs of a tendency on Mr Obama’s part to tailor his message to whichever audience he is talking to. All politicians do this of course. But Mr Obama’s two-steps have become Astaire-like. For instance, in his primary battle with Mrs Clinton, Mr Obama laid out a timetable for a virtually complete withdrawal from Iraq within 16 months of taking office, specifying a rate of one to two brigades a month. Since starting to campaign in the general election, he has fudged this clear line: he committed to withdrawal again this week (see article), but he has also been careful to give himself wriggle-room on its pace. Similarly, he once talked of negotiating with the Iranian leadership without preconditions: now he talks of the need for “prep***tions”.
第三，有些令人不安的迹象表明，奥巴马越来越趋向于对任何观众都传递应时变化的信息。当然，所有的政治人物都这么做。但奥巴马的两步舞跳得神乎其技，仿若弗雷德•阿斯泰尔（20世纪最伟大的舞者之一–译者注）。譬如，在与希拉里的预选战中，奥巴马列出了时间表，称将在就职后的16个月内从伊拉克完全撤军，规定每个月撤1到2个旅。自从角力大选以来，他就不断篡变立场：本周，他再度强调自己致力于撤军行动，但也小心翼翼地在撤军速度上留下予己回还的空间。与此类似，他也曾表示在不设前提的条件下与伊朗领导层展开协商，但如今却改口称需设”前提”。
Both these alterations make sense, but many Europeans won’t like them. Other bits of pandering could be more costly. Mr Obama recently told the main pro-Israel group in Washington that Jerusalem must never be divided, a position that goes beyond those of the Clinton and Bush administrations (not to mention that of many Israelis). Then he backtracked.
这两项变化可以理解，但许多欧洲人并不乐于接受。其它迎合民意的做法代价可能更高。奥巴马近来告知华盛顿亲以色列的主要团体，称决不可分隔耶路撒冷，这一立场相比了克林顿政府和布什政府的官员（更别提许多以色列人）走得更远。而后，他又有所退缩。
Doffing the cap
你好，国会On trade, Mr Obama used to demand the renegotiation of NAFTA; now he stresses his dedication to the cause of free trade. A welcome adjustment, but he is almost certain, if elected, to have a heavily Democratic Congress which is liable to send him protectionist legislation he may find it hard to veto. On climate change he, like Mr McCain, favours a cap-and-trade system. But the Democrat-controlled Congress recently failed to agree even on a watered-down version of such a plan, without any need for a veto from George Bush.
在贸易方面，奥巴马曾要求重新商议北美自由贸易协定；而如今，他则强调自己对此进程的贡献。这一调整值得欢迎，但他若当选，几乎必定会面对一个民主党占据主导的国会。这个国会多半会行送贸易保护法条，而他可能觉得难以下手否决。在气候变化议题上，他和麦凯恩一样，都支持排放上限和贸易制度。但是最近，民主党掌控的国会甚至未能就这样一项打了折扣的制度方案达成共识，（在这种情况下，）布什的否决毫无必要。
On all these fronts, in fact, there are doubts: doubts as to just what Mr Obama’s positions as president would actually be, and doubts over what he could get through Congress. Those doubts will not stop the crowds turning out for him, even if he fails to commandeer the Brandenburg Gate as his backdrop. But the fans should bear in mind that what they see is not precisely what they will get.
事实上，选民对所有这些议题都心存疑虑：奥巴马登上大位后的真实立场会是怎样；还有，他能让国会通过什么议案。这些疑虑不会阻止民众出门投票，即使他未能”征用”勃兰登堡门作为自己的演说台。不过，追捧者应当记住，今日之所见未必是明朝之所得。

幕小后

Al-Qaeda’s global jihad
基地组织的全球圣战How to win the war within Islam
怎样在伊斯兰世界赢得战争Jul 17th 2008
From The Economist print edition
In the long run, al-Qaeda will be defeated by Muslims, not foreigners. But the West can still help
若计长远，打败基地的不是外国人，而是穆斯林。但西方仍可大力支援。

AMERICA’S “global war on terrorism”, now in its seventh year, has gone on longer than the second world war. Will it ever end? Optimists believe some kind of victory is in sight: Iraq is improving; al-Qaeda has been unable to stage a big attack in the West in three years; and terrorists have shown little sign of using weapons of mass destruction. Jihadists face an ideological backlash, even from radical “brothers” who support jihad but disagree with killing Muslims.
美国的 “全球反恐战争”，现在已到了第七年，耗时超过二战。这场战争会不会永无休止？乐观主义者相信，某种意义上的胜利已经摆在眼前：伊拉克形势渐渐好转，基地在三年内都未对西方进行大规模的反攻，恐怖分子没有要使用大规模杀伤性武器的任何迹象。圣战分子面临意识形态的溃败，甚至连最极端的”哥们儿”也有了异见。这些”哥们儿”支持圣战，但是不赞同杀害穆斯林。
Welcome as al-Qaeda’s setbacks may be, the world should not be complacent. As our special report in this issue explains, the threat is likely to last for decades. One reason is that al-Qaeda, though weaker in Iraq, has created a new sanctuary in Pakistan’s tribal belt. Another is that al-Qaeda’s ideology has spread far and wide thanks to the internet and ease of travel. A third is that anti-Americanism remains powerful across the Muslim world. Only a tiny proportion of the world’s billion or so Muslims need to take up jihad to create serious trouble.
世界或许可以为挫败基地而欢呼，但绝不能自满。正如我们本期的特别报道中所说的那样，基地的威胁很可能持续好几十年。理由一，基地的势力虽然在伊拉克有所削弱，但却在巴基斯坦的部落带里建立了新的避难所。理由二，借助于互联网和便捷的旅游，基地的意识形态散播得越来越广。理由三，反美心态在穆斯林世界依然强烈。近10亿穆斯林当中一小部分人就足以轩起圣战，制造大麻烦。
That is particularly true because al-Qaeda is so nebulous and its violence, unlike that of earlier nationalist or sectarian terrorists, is so unrestrained. The days when the Irish Republican Army telephoned warnings of its bombs, and at times apologised for killing bystanders, seem quaint in an age of human-guided bombs seeking to maximise bloodshed.
基地分子隐身暗处，无法无天，完全不同于早期的民族主义分子和宗派恐怖分子。以前，爱尔兰共和军打通电话，警告要投放炸弹，又不时为炸死无辜平民而道歉。今天，基地组织为了尽量扩大法伤亡人数，不惜使用人体炸弹。曾经那个时代与今日的血腥是多么格格不入啊。
In the 19th century anarchists mainly assassinated rulers; in the 1970s terrorists typically killed tens of people; and by the 1980s and 1990s hundreds died in bombings. On September 11th 2001 al-Qaeda killed nearly 3,000 people. If it had chemical, biological or radiological weapons or, less likely, nuclear ones-all big “ifs”, admittedly-it would use them.
19世纪，反政府主义者大多是暗杀统治者；20世纪70年代，恐怖分子象征性地杀害几十个人；20世纪80和90年代，几百人丧生炸弹。2001年9月 11日，将近3000人丧生于基地分子之手。他们如果有化学武器、生物武器、放射性武器，或是几率更小的核武器，种种可怕的武器，毋庸置疑，只要有，他们就会使用。
For global jihadists the reward is in p***dise, so life is cheap. They do not seek realistic political gains, but dream of restoring the mythologised caliphate that was abolished by Ataturk in 1924. Al-Qaeda has woven many strands of grievance into a simple single narrative: Islam is under attack from all sides; America, the West, the Jews (along with puppet ***b leaders and treacherous Shias) are to blame; it is the duty of every Muslim to fight them; and Muslims who object are apostates. Thus is mass murder justified as a defence of Islam.
对全球的圣战分子而言，上了天堂才会有回报，所以生命是下贱的。他们并不追求现实的政治利益，而是发梦要复兴神话中的伊斯兰皇权，这一皇权在1924年就被土耳其之父（凯末尔）废除了。基地将千丝万缕的怨恨编织为一个简单的说法：伊斯兰四面受敌；美国、西方和犹太人，还有阿拉伯的傀儡领导和变节的什叶派，都应受到谴责；每一个穆斯林都有责任与他们作战；反对圣战的穆斯林就是背信弃义。正是如此，大肆屠杀堂而皇之地成了捍卫伊斯兰之战。
How to confront the menace? Al-Qaeda must be denied victory, denied sanctuary and denied the ability to organise attacks. Regardless of the rights and wrongs of Western intervention, America must not leave Iraq over-hastily and will need to shore up its forces in Afghanistan. In time, though, the West should draw back from combat in favour of more discreet assistance. Al-Qaeda seeks to attack the “far enemy”, America, because the “near enemy”, the region’s governments, are hard to fight. The West should seek to invert this equation. It must encourage and help weak governments, such as Pakistan’s, to extend their writ and deny the terrorists a haven. International intelligence co-operation must be strengthened.
怎样才能对抗这样的威胁？必须让基地尝不到胜利，找不到栖身之地，失去组织袭击的能力。不论西方的介入是对是错，美国都不能过于草率地离开伊拉克，并且还需要在阿富汗保持武力，虽然西方迟早都会从战场中退出，以给予更周全的帮助。基地企图袭击”远敌”美国，是因为”近敌”–地方政府–不容易对付，西方当要扭转这一局面。西方必须鼓励和帮助弱小的政府，比如巴基斯坦总统，来扩大他们的权利，让恐怖分子找不到安身之处。并且要加强国际情报合作，打击恐怖分子。
All this will mean supping with less-than-savoury figures. But the West must not lose sight of its most compelling idea: democracy. The greater struggle against jihadists is in the realm of ideas. Al-Qaeda must be denied the claim to be defending Muslims or to speak on their behalf. Jihadists say democracy is sinful “man-made” law, but Muslims everywhere seize the right to choose their leaders when given the opportunity.
这一切意味着要亲近那些不太让人愉快的人物。但是西方不能忘记自己要传播的最重要的理念：民主。与圣战分子更大的斗争在于意识形态。必须让基地不能再口口声称是在保护穆斯林，必须剥夺他们代表穆斯林的权利。圣战分子把民主说成是罪恶的、”人为的”法律，但是只要有机会，世界各地的穆斯林无一不争取选择自己领导人的权利。
Democracy, though, is neither an instant nor complete solution. Elections can heighten sectarian tensions, and may produce weaker or more anti-Western governments. It becomes discredited if it is seen as an imposition, or if democracies use torture. Nevertheless, it offers the best hope of moderating those who use Islam as a weapon of protest. Authoritarian regimes, even if friendly, should be nudged towards reform.
然而，民主，既不是权宜之计，也不是万全之策。选举会加剧派系矛盾，选举出来的政府可能会更无能，或是更反西方。如果人们觉得民主是被强行扣在他们头上，亦或民主国家实施迫害，人们就会渐渐不信任民主。然而，民主带来的最大希望，是它能让那些将伊斯兰当作盾牌的人找不到站不住脚跟。同时，民主也将促成独裁政府改革，哪怕独裁者亲和善政。
In Pakistan America invested all in its military ruler, Pervez Musharraf, but his support collapsed. Islamists who are not violent, like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, should be able to contest free elections. In Turkey, secularists are wrong to try to ban the Islamist-tinged ruling party, AKP (see article). Preventing moderate Islamists from gaining power at the ballot box only encourages extreme ones to seek it by violence.
在巴基斯坦，美国把所有砝码压在军事独裁者穆沙拉夫身上。但是穆沙拉夫的支持已经不复存在了。那些非暴力的伊斯兰分子，如埃及的穆斯林兄弟会，应当可以角逐自由选举。在土耳其，世俗主义者试图禁止有伊斯兰人参与的党派（AKP）参政，这是错误的。阻止伊斯兰温和派在选举获得实权，只会激起伊斯兰极端分子暴力夺权。
Some lump together all forms of Islamism as a deadly enemy, akin to fascism and communism. A more accurate analysis, and a better strategy, would be to disaggregate the problems. The rhetoric of the “global war” on terrorism only strengthens global jihad. As the West learns the limits of force, it is Muslims, not foreign soldiers, who will defeat al-Qaeda.
有人把所有伊斯兰教义都混为一谈，视其为死敌，如同法西斯和共产主义。若能更明智地分析，用更好的战略，问题将会得到化解。”全球反恐战争”的措辞反会助长全球圣战的势力。西方也看到了，有些问题不是武力能解决的，可以打败基地的，不是外国士兵，而是穆斯林人民。
Yet foreigners do still have a role to play in what is, at its core, a violent contest within Islam. A useful move would be to make a greater effort to extinguish some of the fires of radicalism, such as the conflicts over Palestine and Kashmir. But diplomacy, like democracy, is no panacea. Muslim resentment of the West has a complex pathology, dating back to the Spanish reconquista in medieval times; that is hardly something that can be undone. Still, it is worth addressing real grievances.
然而，在伊斯兰世界的激烈较量中，外国人仍有重要的作用。一次有力的行动将会大大打击极端主义的气焰，就如处理巴勒斯坦和喀什米尔的冲突那样。然而，外交，与民主一样，并不包治百病。穆斯林对西方的反感成因复杂，要追溯到中世纪西班牙基督教王国驱逐穆斯林的时期，也就是摩尔人入侵西班牙后的11年。穆斯林的反西方情绪很难根除。但是，为消除真正的怨恨而付出努力仍是值得的。
Six excellent ideas
六条妙计In an internet video in September 2007 Abu Yahya al-Libi, a prominent al-Qaeda leader, mockingly gave the West six tips to wage ideological warfare: highlight the views of jihadists who renounce violence; publicise stories about jihadist atrocities against Muslims; enlist Muslim religious leaders to denounce jihadists as heretics; back Islamic movements that emphasise politics over jihad; discredit and neutralise jihadist ideologues; and play up personal or doctrinal disputes among jihadists. These would indeed be good starting-points.
2007年，一个有名的基地领袖阿布•亚哈•阿立比（Abu Yahya al-Libi）在网络录像上，不无嘲讽地给了西方六条打意识形态战争的建议。第一，着重宣传放弃暴力的圣战分子的观点；第二，公布那些圣战分子对穆斯林施暴的故事；第三，团结穆斯林精神领袖，来谴责圣战分子是叛教；第四，支持那些强调政治手段胜过圣战的伊斯兰运动；第五，败坏圣战支持者的名声，并让他们传为中立；第六，挑拨圣战分子内部的个人或政见争端。这六条建议倒真不失为入门良策。

幕小后

Banks and *****
银行业与市场Twin twisters
二房飓风Jul 17th 2008
From The Economist print edition
The financial crisis claims another two victims-and once again the taxpayer picks up the pieces
金融危机又落两城–纳税人再度收拾残局


IT WAS another of those frantic weeks that were never meant to happen in the world’s most advanced economy. On July 13th Hank Paulson, America’s treasury secretary, stood on his department’s steps like some emerging-market finance minister, and unveiled an emergency plan to save Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two mortgage giants that owe or gu***ntee $5.2 trillion. Two days later, Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve, put the fear of God into the *****, warning Congress of a foul amalgam of inflation and economic distress.
本周，和前几回一样，狂乱无序的局面再一次出人意料地出现在这个全球最发达的经济体。7月13日，美国财长汉克•保尔森（Hank Paulson）像某位新兴市场的金融大臣一样，站在财政部门前的台阶上，宣布了一项紧急计划：援手房利美(Fannie Mae)和房地美(Freddie Mac)。这两家房贷巨擘亏欠或担保的抵押额高达52亿美元。两天后，美联储主席伯南克带着人们对他如同”上帝”般的敬畏，出手房贷市场，警告国会，称通货膨胀和经济困境或将并肩袭来。
The immediate **** is that the financial crisis, nearly a year old, is far from over (see our coverage, beginning with this article). Gloomy investors are gunning for banks of all types. In America the prices of houses and shares are falling, and the cost of food and energy has soared. Consumers are almost certain to cut back. The euro-area economy may have shrunk in the latest quarter. Central banks around the world are having to raise interest rates to curb inflation, and the dollar looks vulnerable. Even if the downturn proves less sharp than pessimists fear, it is likely to last longer than optimists hope.
直观的教训是，延烧了将近一年之久的金融危机还远未结束。愁容惨淡的投资人正把目光投向各类银行。美国的房价和股价持续下跌，粮食和能源成本飙升，消费者紧缩开支几成定局，欧元区经济在本季度可能缩水，各国央行不得不提升利率遏制通胀，美元呈现疲软之势。这一轮的经济低迷，其影响即便在事实上没有悲观者担心得那样严重，但周期则很可能比乐观派希望得要长。
Freddie and Fannie have changed that equation only slightly. Their importance lies in what their rescue says about the financial system. At Fannie and Freddie-and, shockingly, at the investment banks-the profits were privatised, but the risks were socialised. One Republican senator complained that he thought he had “woken up in France”. Mr Paulson was still right to intervene: the collapse of Fannie and Freddie would have been a catastrophe. But by not formally nationalising them, he has let down taxpayers and made the same deeply uncapitalist mistake the British government initially made with Northern Rock, a failed mortgage bank it tried to prop up.
二房危机轻微地打破了这种平衡。这两家机构的重要性，从政府救市对于金融体系的意义中就可见一斑。房地美和房利美–以及投资银行（这让人触目惊心）– 利润私有化，但风险却社会化了。一位共和党参议员抱怨说，他以为自己当时是”在法国醒来。”保尔森插手干预仍是明智之举：二房的倒闭将会酿成一场灾难。可是，他未能将之正式国有化，因而辜负了纳税人，犯了和英国同样严重的非资本主义的错误–英国政府之前力图挽救濒临倒闭的北岩抵押房贷银行。
Mark to market, or market to Marx?
市场还是计划？The debt is what matters with Fannie and Freddie, but the shares were the trigger. When investors realised they would eventually need more money to cover their looming losses, there was a run on the stock. This rapidly became a test of a tacit government pledge to back their debt. Had the government hinted that it wanted to wriggle free from its vague promises, the debt would have crashed; the banking system would have been crippled by new losses; foreign investors would have fled a country that broke its word; and the housing market, a trifle short of lenders just now, would have lost its main backers. Mr Paulson vowed to lend Fannie and Freddie money and buy their shares if necessary. They could also borrow from the Fed. The next day investors queued up to buy Freddie’s bonds.
二房的债务是关键所在，但股价乃为诱因。投资人在意识到最终需要更多的资金才能弥补迫在眉睫的损失时，便在股市上狂抛撤资。这很快成为了检测政府是否暗中允诺插手纾困的手段。如果政府此前暗示要转变暧昧的态度，便宜行事，那么高举的债务早已崩塌，银行系统业已陷入新的亏损，外国投资者业已然逃离这个言而无信的国家；而之前贷方略显不足的房市，也已失去了主要的支撑者。保尔森先生誓言要贷款给二房，并在必要的时候收购其股票。两家机构也可从联储会借款。翌日，投资人排起长龙，争购房地美的债券。
That is plainly not the end of it for the taxpayer. It seems quaint that critics once complained that finance was all about untrammelled ***** and deregulation. On July 11th regulators took over IndyMac Bancorp, a Californian thrift, after the second-biggest bank failure in American history. After the rescue of Bear Stearns in March, the Fed agreed to back investment banks with its balance sheet. Congress is chewing over a small subsidy to troubled mortgage owners. If another large bank became vulnerable, more rescues would beckon.
对于纳税人来说，这还不是真正的结束。批评家曾经抱怨金融业务都在围绕着不受制约的市场和违规行为打转，眼下这倒显得奇怪。7月11日，在印地麦克（IndyMac）这一美国历史上第二宗最大规模的银行倒闭案后，监理机构接管了这家位于加州的存贷公司。继今年3月援手贝尔斯登之后，联储会此次同意直接注资支持投行。国会正反复考虑向身陷困境的抵押人提供小额补贴。如果再有一家大型银行撑不住了，更多的援救计划也指日可待。
Capitalism rests on a clear principle: those who get the profits should take the pain. For the system to work, bankers sometimes need to lose their jobs and investors their shirts. Yet were a collapsing Bear Stearns or Fannie Mae to sow destruction for the sake of a principle, it would impose a terrible price in lost jobs and output on everyone else. The unpalatable truth is that by the time a financial crisis hits, the state often has to compromise-to impose as much pain as it can, of course, but to shoulder a large part of the losses nonetheless.
资本主义建基于一个清晰的原则，即获利者应付出代价。为了让这一体系运转下去，银行家有时要丢掉饭碗，投资人可能会倾家荡产。但是，如果摇摇欲坠的贝尔斯登或房利美为了一个原则而走向灭亡，那么由此导致的失业和经济产量下跌等极高的代价都将平摊到其他所有人身上。这正是令人不快的真相：金融危机来袭之时，国家常常不得不妥协–尽可能多地让人付出代价，但也承担起一大部分的损失。
That formula comes at a heavy price. Fannie and Freddie were supposed to help Americans buy their own homes, by making the mortgage market work better. But it has been an awful deal for the taxpayer-a Fed economist calculated the implicit debt-gu***ntee was worth a one-off sum of between $122 billion and $182 billion. Because Fannie and Freddie barely lowered the cost of borrowing, little of this subsidy went towards boosting home ownership. Instead, just over half-about $79 billion-went straight to their shareholders.
这么做代价不小。二房本该帮助美国人购置房产，保持房贷市场的健康运转，但事实上，这对纳税人来说却是一笔糟糕的交易–根据联储会一名经济学家的计算，二房暗中持有的债务担保，其一次性总额价值在1220到1820亿美元之间。由于两家企业几乎没怎么降低借贷的成本，这些补贴中只有很少的一部分用于促进房贷业务，而超过一半–大约790亿美元–直接由其股东收益。
Normal financial-services firms should have been dealing in the safe, middle-of-the road mortgages that Fannie and Freddie specialise in. Except that they were crowded out into subprime mortgages. Fannie and Freddie should never have grown so large. Except that they wanted to exploit the margin between the government-gu***nteed borrowing costs and the commercial lending income. They should have been stopped by Congress and their regulator. Except that they spent some of their subsidy on a fierce lobbying machine.
正常的金融服务商本该经营二房擅长的不冒风险、中规中矩的抵押业务–可惜它们被挤入了次贷市场；房利美和房地美原本不会成长到今天的规模–可惜它们想赚取政府担保的贷款成本和商业贷款收入之间的差额；二房本该受制于国会和监理机构–可惜它们将部分补贴用于雇佣强劲有力的游说机器。
Fannie must not
“房”不可倒In the past, we have argued for privatising Fannie and Freddie completely. But now that the gu***ntee is explicit, Mr Paulson should seek to secure the gains for taxpayers and treat Fannie and Freddie like one of their own mortgages, by nationalising them, breaking them up and selling them on. That would almost double the public debt-but only in book-keeping terms. The liability is already implicit (as at Northern Rock), and, unlike Treasuries, it is ultimately backed by housing as collateral.
过去，我们支持对二房实行彻底的私有化，但眼下，既然政府的担保已经明确无误，保尔森就该为纳税人考虑，谋求保护其财富，并将二房当作自身抵押的资产之一，进行国有化，拆分，继而出售。这么做几乎要让国债翻一番–不过只会出现在簿记账面上。二房的债务已转入后台操作（如同北岩银行），而且最终有房市的间接支撑，这一点不同于国库券。
It is harder to know what to do about all those other implicit state gu***ntees-seemingly to any financial outfit. The first instinct should be to make sure someone suffers; shareholders and managers at the very least. It was a valuable **** when some of IndyMac’s depositors could not get hold of their money because they exceeded the government gu***ntee.
想知道其它那些拥有国家暗中担保的机构何去何从，这更不容易–对于任何金融机构似乎都是这样。依据本能，第一步应该是确保有人承受苦痛，而股东和管理层至少该承担责任。印地麦克的一些存款人由于未受政府担保而无法保住钱财，这是个宝贵的教训。
If you cannot let firms fail in a bust, then you must contain them in the boom. That helps explain why the investment banks now need more supervision; why financial firms should have to hold more capital as a boom gathers pace; and why monetary policy should lean against rising asset prices. Regulation is necessary, but beware the state being seduced into taking on duties it cannot possibly carry out well. As Fannie and Freddie show, regulators are easily captured and outwitted. The best controls are transparency and competition. When possible the government needs to stand back. Sadly, it failed to do so in the American mortgage market.
如果不能让企业完全破产，就应保证它们业务兴旺。这有助于解释投行在眼下为什么需要更多的监管；金融机构为什么得在繁荣行将消失时握有更多的资本；以及货币政策为什么应向上涨的资产价格倾斜。监管是必需的，但得谨防政府被误入歧途，承担起可能无法良好履行的职责。二房危机表明，监理机构的政策容易落后于、受困于时局。最好的管制手段是透明度和相互竞争，政府应在可能的时候退居二线。遗憾的是，在美国的房贷抵押市场中，政府没能这么做。